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We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — 
courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze 
a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve 
on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is 
to maximize the parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance. We study a buyer-seller multiple-
widget model with risk-neutral agents, asymmetric information and ex-ante investments. The 
court must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it. The parties know their 
private information at the time of contracting, and this drives a wedge between ex-ante and 
interim-efficient contracts. In particular, if the court enforces all contracts, pooling obtains in 
equilibrium. By voiding some contracts the court is able to induce them to separate, and hence 
improve ex-ante welfare. In some cases, an ambiguous court that voids and upholds both with 
positive probability may be able to increase welfare even further. 
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1. Introduction
It is self-evident that courts are active players in contractual relationships between
economic agents. They routinely intervene in contractual disputes, excusing per-
formance called for in the contract because of intervening events. Yet, in most of
modern economic theory courts are treated (often not even modeled, but left in the
background) as passive enforcers of the will of the parties embodied in their contrac-
tual agreements.
This simplistic view of the role of courts stems from the fact that in a world with
complete contracts, to behave as a passive enforcer is clearly the best that a court
that is interested in maximizing contracting parties’ welfare can do. In the “classical”
world of modern economic theory, contracts are complete.
In a world in which complete contracts are not feasible it is no longer obvious that
a court should be a passive enforcer, and in fact it is no longer true. For example, the
contracting parties may face some uninsurable risk and the court may improve their
welfare if it is able to use some information available ex-post and excuse performance
in some eventualities.1
Once the way for an active court is open, a host of related questions naturally arise.
The aim of this paper is to address the following one. Suppose that the court cannot
condition (ex-ante or ex-post) on any variable that cannot be contracted on by the
parties themselves. Is it then the case that the court can play any welfare-enhancing
role?
The answer to the question above is “yes” if the parties are asymmetrically in-
formed at the time they contract and the court maximizes their ex-ante welfare,
that is, their expected welfare before either party gets information not available to
the other. Asymmetry in parties’ information at the time they contract can lead to a
“lemons-like” situation in which adverse selection leads to ineﬃcient contracts. courts
that do not simply enforce contracts as they are written can sometimes ameliorate
the ineﬃciency that results from asymmetric information.
1This is the case, for instance, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2007).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 2
We show in the paper that in a world where contracting parties are asymmetrically
informed this is indeed the case. We also derive the optimal decision rule for an
active welfare-maximizing court. This rule implies that the court in equilibrium
voids contracts that the contracting parties (at the contracting stage) would like the
court to enforce.
The potential beneﬁt of a court’s voiding explicit contractual clauses stems from
asymmetry of information between the parties at the time they contract. Because
of asymmetric information, when the court does not intervene, ineﬃcient trades may
take place: in equilibrium some (ineﬃcient) pooling may obtain. By intervening and
voiding some contractual clauses, the court may be able to negate the incentives
for some types to hide their private information, thus making the pooling no longer
proﬁtable for them. In other words, voiding contracts in some cases will decrease the
expected gain from withholding private information, thereby promoting disclosure
and hence increasing ex-ante welfare. Clearly voiding some contractual clauses will
come at a cost: some surplus-generating trades will no longer take place. However,
there will be a net ex-ante welfare gain when the improvement from the additional
disclosure outweighs the ineﬃciency from voiding.
The view that courts should maximize ex-ante welfare is a compelling one. If the
parties were able to meet at the ex-ante stage (when they are symmetrically informed)
agreements could be reached that circumvent ineﬃciencies that are unavoidable at
the interim stage when the parties have private information. A court that maximizes
ex-ante expected welfare will choose the same contingent rules of behavior as the
parties would have chosen at that stage, were it possible. In other words, if the
parties could meet at that point, they might instruct the court to void some contracts
they might subsequently write. They will do this precisely because the parties will
understand that while they may regret this in some circumstances, it may promote
the disclosure of private information. This disclosure may increase the eﬃciency of
contracting to an extent that more than outweighs any negative consequences of the
court’s intervention. The problem that the court is solving is that the parties are
often unable to meet before the arrival of their private information. A court thatShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 3
maximizes ex-ante welfare acts as a commitment device that remedies the parties’
inability to contract at the ex-ante stage.
1.1. The Role of Courts in Promoting Disclosure of Information
Courts have had an interest in promoting disclosure of information at least since the
English case of Hadley vs. Baxendale in 1854.2 The court held in that case that a
defendant who breached a contract was liable only for damages that might reasonably
have arisen given the known facts rather than the higher damages that were actually
suﬀered because of circumstances known only to the plaintiﬀ. As argued in Adler
(1999), the limitation on damages implicit in the Hadley rule is a default that is often
viewed as promoting disclosure: “A party who will suﬀer exceptional damages from
breach need only communicate her situation in advance and gain assent to allowance
so that the damages are unmistakably in the contemplation of both parties’ at the
time of contract.”3 The discussion of the role of courts in promoting information
disclosure, to our knowledge, focusses primarily on the beneﬁt of disclosure to the
contracting parties. In the absence of disclosure, resources will be wasted in writing
needless waiver clauses and ineﬃcient precaution.
Courts will have an interest in promoting disclosure of information in our model,
but for a very diﬀerent reason, and with very diﬀerent consequences. Courts will
aﬀect the amount of information that is revealed by informed parties through their
treatment of contracts that reveal little information. While contracts may reveal little
information simply because the parties have little information, courts will treat such
contracts more harshly than they otherwise might because of the incentive eﬀects
such treatment will have on informed parties. Those with relevant information will
reveal it in order that courts will more likely enforce the agreements that are made.
Thus, courts are not examining a contract brought before them solely to uncover the
parties’ intent. They also take into consideration how the treatment of the contract
29 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145. (Court of Exchequer, 1854).
3See Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) for a discussion of the Hadley
rule and it’s role in promoting disclosure. See also Maskin (2005) for a critical view.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 4
will aﬀect contracting parties diﬀerent from the parties before them.
1.2. Related Literature
There is a growing literature that explicitly models the role of courts in contractual
relationships. Bond (2003) and Usman (2002) model the agency problems (moral-
hazard) that stem from hidden actions that the court itself can take, while Levy
(2005) models the eﬀect on the court’s decision of the judge’s career concern. Bond
(2003) analyzes optimal contracting between parties when judges can impose an out-
come other than the contracted outcome in exchange for a bribe. Bond shows that in
a simple agency model, this possibility will make the contracting parties less likely to
employ high-powered contracts. Usman (2002) lays out a model in which contracts
contain variables that are not observable to courts unless a rational and self-interested
judge exerts costly eﬀort. Usman (2002) analyzes contracting behavior and the in-
centive to breach when judges value the correct ruling but dislike eﬀort. Levy (2005)
analyzes the trade-oﬀ that arises when the judge in ruling on a dispute is, at the
same time, trying to inﬂuence the perception of the public (or an evaluator) about
his own ability. This trade-oﬀ can induce the judge to distort his decision to avoid
his decision being appealed and possibly reversed.
The courts in these papers are governed by a judge who maximizes his or her
personal utility. In contrast to these papers, there is a literature that analyzes courts
that maximize the expected welfare of the contracting parties. Posner (1998) analyzes
whether a court should consider information extrinsic to the contract in interpreting
the contract. Closer to the current paper, Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and
Shavell (1991) analyze the degree to which courts’ interpretation of contracts aﬀect
incentives to reveal private information. The focus of this work is the eﬀect of diﬀerent
court rules regarding damages for breach of contract on the incentives for parties to
disclose information regarding the costs of breach at the time of contracting. Shavell
(2006) presents a general examination of the role of courts in interpreting contracts.
The present paper analyzes the role of a welfare-maximizing court that can aﬀect
the type of contracts that are written by excusing performance (voiding the contract)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 5
in some circumstances. The possibility of welfare improvements are a consequence of
the eﬀect of the court’s rules for enforcing contracts on the parties’ incentives to reveal
private information. Our paper diﬀers from Ayres and Gertner (1989), Bebchuk and
Shavell (1991) and Shavell (2006) in that we focus on the externality that informed
contracting parties may impose on uninformed contracting parties, which is absent
from these papers.
Unlike Ayres and Gertner (1989), Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) and Shavell (2006),
our focus is on the externality that informed contracting parties may impose on
uninformed contracting parties, which is absent from these papers.
1.3. Outline
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. We present a simple example illustrating
how courts may increase welfare by selectively voiding contracts in the next Section
and the general model and analysis in Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes
the paper. For ease of exposition all proofs have been gathered in the Appendix.4
2. Example
Our main aim in this paper is to investigate the role of courts as active players
in contractual situations, and to demonstrate that an active court can sometimes
increase contracting parties’ welfare by voiding voluntary contracts. We will illustrate
this with a simple example.
Consider a homeowner (HO) dealing with a contractor on home improvements.
The HO wants to replace a beam in his roof. There is a large number of potential
contractors, and the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to a contractor, who
will accept an oﬀer if and only if it covers his costs. After the contract is signed, the
HO has to sink the cost of temporarily moving out of the property, which we take to
1. There are two types of homeowners: Careful and Careless. The Careful HO has
maintained his home properly and gets a relatively low value from the replacement
4In the numbering of Propositions, Lemmas, equations and so on, a preﬁx of “A” indicates that
the relevant item can be found in the Appendix.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 6
beam, 4. The Careless HO has skipped all normal maintenance and is aware that
his house may fall down if the beam is not replaced, resulting is a much higher value
from replacing the beam, 26. The cost to the contractor of replacing the beam is
1, independent of whether the homeowner is Careful or Careless. The HO has the
option of getting a building permit for the replacement at a cost of 4. The building
permit plays no role in the values other than as a cost to the HO. Thus, the costs to
the contractor (c) and the values to the buyer (v), gross of the moving cost of 1, are
given in the table below.
Beam With Permit Beam W/Out Permit
Careless HO v = 22, c = 1 v = 26, c = 1
Careful HO v = 0, c = 1 v = 4, c = 1
The HO knows whether he is Careful type or the Careless type, but the contractor
knows only that it is equally likely that the homeowner is Careful or Careless. Given
our assumption that the HO can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the contractor, it
is clear that the only equilibrium here is a pooling equilibrium in which both types
of homeowner make an oﬀer to the contractor to put in the beam without a permit
at a price of 1.
We now assume that once the contract has been signed, it is possible for the home-
owner and the contractor to add an additional job to be done on the house without
any additional investment on the part of the HO. During the initial construction
work, it is found that the HO’s basement is damp, and the homeowner would like
this corrected. Assume that the bargaining positions have been reversed now that
the contractor’s crew is on site. Speciﬁcally, assume that the contractor now has all
the bargaining power and can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the homeowner to
ﬁx the basement.5 There is a fundamental diﬀerence between the basement and the
beam projects, however. The beneﬁts to the Careless HO are 76, but the cost is high
5The assumption that the homeowner has all the bargaining power ex-ante and the contractor
all the bargaining power ex-post is for expository purposes. Similar examples can be constructed so
long as the HO does not have all the bargaining power both ex-ante and ex-post.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 7
– 100 – as a consequence of the Careless HO’s neglect. The beneﬁts to the Careful
HO are less, 65, but the costs to the contractor for this HO are minimal: 3. The costs
are not observable to the contractor and will only be known after the contract to do
the work is signed (if it is, in fact, signed). The costs and beneﬁts are shown in the
augmented table below, again gross of the moving cost of 1.
Beam With Permit Beam W/Out Permit Dry Basement
Careless HO v = 22, c = 1 v = 26, c = 1 v = 76, c = 100
Careful HO v = 0, c = 1 v = 4, c = 1 v = 65, c = 3
Assuming that the court enforces all contracts, the game between the HO and
the contractor involves the HO making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the contractor in
stage 1, following which the contractor makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the HO in
stage 2. We assume that the costs and beneﬁts are not veriﬁable, hence oﬀers by the
contractor to ﬁx the basement on a cost-plus basis are not possible. Since both types
of homeowner make the same oﬀer in stage 1, the contractor’s options are restricted
to make an oﬀer to dry the basement at a given price, independent of which HO he
faces. It is easy to see that the contractor will oﬀer to do this at a price of 65. At
this price the contractor’s expected cost is 52.5, yielding him a proﬁt of 12.5. The
only change if he were to oﬀer to take on the job at a lower price is that his revenue
decreases. At any price greater than 65 but no greater than 76, only the Careless
HO would accept the oﬀer, giving the contractor a negative payoﬀ, while neither type
accepts any oﬀer at a price higher than 76.
It is straightforward to verify that the unique perfect Bayes equilibrium for the
two-stage game has both types of homeowner pooling on the contract that oﬀers the
contractor 1 to put in the beam without a permit, followed by the contractor oﬀering
to dry the basement at a price of 65. There is an ineﬃciency in this contract relative to
the ﬁrst-best outcome in that the contractor takes on the job of drying the basement
for the Careless HO. In this case, the cost is greater than the beneﬁt; eﬃciency would
dictate that the job not be done in this case. We will next argue that there is aShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 8
welfare improvement if the court voids contracts to put in a beam without a permit.
Suppose that the court enforces all contracts except those involving putting in
a beam without a permit. We next describe the unique perfect Bayes equilibrium
when these contracts are not enforced. As before, any oﬀer to put in a beam with
a permit at a price at least 1 will be accepted by the contractor, while any oﬀer at
a lower price will be rejected. Thus, the Careless HO will oﬀer the contractor 1 to
put in the beam with a permit, and the Careful HO will not make any oﬀer in stage
1. Since the two types of homeowner separate in stage 1, in stage 2 the contractor
will know the cost of drying the basement for each type of homeowner. Thus, he will
make no oﬀer to dry the basement to the Careless HO, and oﬀer to dry the basement
for a price of 65 to the Careful HO, who obviously will accept the oﬀer. The only
remaining detail to be checked is that the Careless HO has no incentive to pool with
the Careful HO in the ﬁrst stage by not making an oﬀer to put in the beam with a
permit, thereby getting an oﬀer to dry the basement in the second stage. Getting an
oﬀer in the second stage to dry his basement for a price of 65 gives the Careless HO
a gain of 11 (given by 76 − 65) in the second stage, but results in the loss of a net
gain of 21 in the ﬁrst stage.
The expected surplus in the unique perfect Bayes equilibrium when the court
enforces all contracts is 1/2 × (surplus to Careless HO) + 1/2 × (surplus to Careful
HO)−HO’s Investment= 1/2[(25 + (−24)) + (3 + 60)] − 1 = 31, while the expected
surplus in the unique perfect Bayes equilibrium when the court voids contracts to put
in the beam without a permit is 1/2[(21+0−1)+(0+60)] = 40. Thus, a court voiding
those contracts to put in a beam without a permit increases the expected surplus by
9 relative to the surplus when the court enforces all contracts. A court that voids
contracts without a permit induces the two types of homeowner to separate, and the
consequent increase in information leads to eﬃcient contracting in stage 2.
The welfare criterion employed in this calculation is ex-ante expected surplus.
That is, we are taking the expected surplus across the two types of the homeowner.
The ex-ante gain in surplus is accompanied by a redistribution of net beneﬁts across
the two types: the Careless HO is worse oﬀ when the court voids contracts withoutShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 9
permit and the Careful HO is better oﬀ, suﬃciently so as to more than oﬀset the
decrease in net beneﬁt to the Careless HO. We argue below that this is the appropriate
welfare criterion for such problems.
The example is special in several ways, and we neither argue that real-world courts
will frequently be confronted with such cases, nor that there is a clear guide for real-
world courts as to when to void contracts to induce information revelation. Our point
is that such cases do exist, and to the extent that courts are able to identify them,
voiding is desirable.
We turn next to a more general examination of such problems.
3. The Model
3.1. Passive Courts
In this section we extend our analysis of the example to general values to allow a
better understanding of the characteristics of situations in which a court can increase
welfare by selectively voiding contracts.
A buyer B and a seller S face a potentially proﬁtable trade of three widgets,
denoted w1, w2 and w3 respectively. Widgets w1 and w2 are “speciﬁc.” They require
a widget- and relationship-speciﬁc investment I > 0 on B’s part. The buyer can only
undertake one of the two widget-speciﬁc investments. The value and cost of both w1
and w2 are zero in the absence of investment, and we assume that it is possible to
undertake at most one of the two possible widget-speciﬁc investments.
Widget w3 is not speciﬁc. Its cost and value do not depend on any investment.
We assume that w3 is not contractible at the ex-ante stage. This is with little loss of
generality, except for the case in which “menu contracts” are allowed.6 Widget w3
can be traded regardless of any ex-ante decision. In practice, we can think of w3 as
being traded (or not) at the ex-post stage.
6We discuss menu contracts in Section 7 below.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 10
The buyer has private information at the time of contracting. He knows his type,
which can be either α or β. Each type is equally likely, and the seller does not know
B’s type.
To complete the description of our trading set-up, it is now suﬃcient to specify
the cost and value of each widget, for each possible B type, when investment takes
place. We specify them using the smallest number of parameters that we believe are
necessary for our results to hold. This is for the sake of simplicity only. The costs and
values in the six combinations of of types and widgets could be speciﬁed independently
without aﬀecting our results provided that the appropriate assumptions hold, but they
would be less transparent. With this in mind, we take the cost and value of the three
widgets to be as in the table below, where they are represented net of the cost of
investment I > 0.7 In each cell of the table, the left entry represents surplus, and
the right entry represents cost (obviously the sum of the two gives the value, net of
investment cost).
w1 w2 w3
Type α ∆M, cL ∆H, cL −∆H, cH
Type β ∆N, cL ∆L, cL ∆S, cS
(1)
For the remainder of the paper, we take these parameters to satisfy the following.
Assumption 1. Parameter Values: The values of cost and surplus in the matrix in
(1) satisfy8,9
(i) 0 < ∆L < ∆M < ∆H
and
7The gross value is therefore computed as the sum of cost, surplus and I, while the gross cost is
the cost value reported in table (1).
8To ﬁx ideas, it might be useful to consider one possible set of values that satisfy all the conditions
needed. These are ∆N = −1, ∆L = 2, ∆M = 20, ∆H = 24, ∆S = 62, cL = 1, cS = 3 and cH = 100.
9The numbers in the example above would have to be modiﬁed slightly to satisfy these assump-
tions, which are somewhat stronger than are necessary to generate the phenomenon exhibited there.
These stronger assumptions will make the equilibria robust against menu contracts; we discuss this
in 7 below.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 11
(ii) ∆M + ∆H < ∆S
and
(iii) cS + ∆H + ∆S +
∆M
2
< cH < ∆S + 2 ∆M
and
(iv) 0 < −∆N < ∆H − ∆M − ∆L
and
(v) cL < cS
The costs and values of the three widgets are not contractible. Any contract
between B and S can only specify the widget(s) to be traded, and price(s).
We interpret this contractibility assumption in the following way. The court can
only observe (verify) which one of w1 or w2 is speciﬁed in any contract, and whether
the correct widget is traded or not as prescribed, and the appropriate price paid.
It is important to notice that the court never has information that is superior to
the trading parties. In fact, ex-ante the court does not know B’s type, and hence
has information that matches the seller’s. Ex-post the court has information that is
inferior to both trading parties, since S will eventually discover his cost of production
and hence B’s type.10
To keep matters simple, we assume that B has all the bargaining power at the
ex-ante contracting stage, while S has all the bargaining power ex-post. The ﬂavor
of our results would be preserved under less extreme assumptions about bargaining
power. What is needed is that B does not have full bargaining power ex-post since
this would eliminate the need for an ex-ante contract. Even without a contract B
would invest in one of the speciﬁc widgets (depending on his type), and all prices
could be determined ex-post.
To sum up, the timing and relevant decision variables available to the trading
parties are as follows.
10See the timing structure of the model described in detail below.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 12
The buyer learns his type before meeting the seller. Then B and S meet at the ex-
ante contracting stage. At this point B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract
to S, which S can accept or reject. A contract consists of a pair si = (wi,pi), with
i = 1,2 specifying a single widget to trade and at which price. After a contract (if
any) is signed, B decides whether to invest or not, and in which of the speciﬁc widgets.
After investment takes place (if it does), the bargaining power shifts to the seller
and we enter the ex-post stage. At this point S makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
B on whether to trade any widget not previously contracted on and at which price,
which B can accept or reject. Without loss of generality, we can restrict S to make a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B on whether to trade w3 and at which price p3. After B
decides whether to accept or reject S’s ex-post oﬀer (if any), production takes place.
First S produces the relevant widgets and then he learns his cost.11 Finally, delivery
and payment occur according to contract terms.
3.2. Active Courts
The trading set up described in Subsection 3.1 is eﬀectively a two-player game between
B and S. The court is a “dummy” player whose strategy is ﬁxed. It simply enforces
the contract terms, by imposing large penalties if they are not observed. As a result,
delivery and payment occur in the last stage of the game, exactly as agreed.
We now model the active court as a third player, C, who makes a non-trivial
choice before any contract is signed at the ex-ante stage. In particular, C can credibly
announce that it will enforce some contracts, but not others. This announcement is
known to both B and S at the time of contracting.
The information of B, S and C and their bargaining power remain as described
above. The timing, investment requirements and all the elements of the matrix in (1)
also stay the same.
11The reason to assume that production costs are sunk before S learns what they are is to prevent
the possibility of ex-post revelation games a la Moore and Repullo (1988) and Maskin and Tirole
(1999). We return to this point below.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 13
The court announces a set of ex-ante contracts U which will be “upheld” and a
set of ex-ante contracts V which will be “voided.” There are two contracts in all to
be considered, one of the type s1 = (w1,p1) and another of the type s2 = (w2,p2).
We restrict C to be able to announce that certain contracts will be upheld or voided,
only according to the widget involved. Therefore U and V are two mutually exclusive
subsets of {s1,s2} with U ∪ V = {s1,s2}, so that eﬀectively the court’s strategy set
consists of a choice of V ⊆ {s1,s2}.
For the moment we restrict C to make deterministic announcements; each contract
is either in V or not with probability one.
If V = ∅ so that all contracts are enforced, then the model is exactly as described
in Subsection 3.1 above. If on the other hand one or two contracts are in V, in the ﬁnal
stage of the game B and S are free to renegotiate the terms (price and delivery) of any
widget in the voided contract, regardless of anything that was previously agreed.12
Notice that, by our assumptions on bargaining power, this means that S is free to
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B of a price pi at which any wi with voided contract
terms is to be delivered.13
The court is a welfare-maximizing player. It chooses V so as to maximize its payoﬀ
which equals the sum of the payoﬀs of B and S.14
Before proceeding with the equilibrium analysis, for completeness, we identify the
12As well as negotiating the terms of trade for w3, as before.
13Implicitly, we are taking the view that trade is feasible ex-post even when contract terms are
voided by the court. This in turn means that C will always act as a “minimal enforcement” institu-
tion. It is not hard to see that our results remain true, and in fact easier to prove, if we took the
view that when contract terms are voided then trade becomes infeasible because even “spot” trading
arrangements are not enforced. One way to see this is to notice that in a sense we are implicitly
considering two types of possible contracts for widgets w2 and w1: ex-ante contracts, which the
court can void or uphold, and ex-post (or “spot”) contracts, which we assume the court will uphold.
If the court were to void the ex-post contracts trade of the relevant widget would become infeasible.
14Clearly, following a particular choice by C multiple equilibrium payoﬀs could ensue in the relevant
subgame. This, for the time being, is a moot issue. In Sections 4 and 5, our analysis relies only on
subgames with a unique equilibrium. In Sections 6 and 7 below this is no longer the case. When
multiple equilibria arise in some relevant subgames, we deem something to be an equilibrium of the
entire model when it is an equilibrium considering the court as an actual player, complete with its
equilibrium beliefs. For more on the distinction between a classical “planner” and a planner who is
also a player see Baliga, Corchon, and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1997).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 14
eﬃcient investment and trading outcome. The following is stated without proof since
it is an obvious consequence of the costs and surplus matrix (1).
Remark 1. Eﬃcient Trade: The unique eﬃcient investment and trading outcome is
as follows. Both types of B invest and trade w2. The type β buyer trades w3, while
the type α buyer does not.
Since the two types of B are equally likely, the total amount of expected surplus









. By deﬁnition, this is also the
court’s payoﬀ.
Eﬃciency is the benchmark to evaluate the equilibria of the model, which we are
now ready to characterize in the two cases of passive and active courts.15
4. Passive Court Equilibria
As we anticipated, when all contracts are enforced, ineﬃcient pooling obtains in
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium With A Passive Court: Suppose the court enforces all
contracts, and that Assumption 1 holds. Then the unique equilibrium outcome of the
model is that the two types of buyer pool with probability one: they both invest and
trade w2 at a price p2 = cL, and they both trade w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.






. By deﬁnition, this is also the court’s payoﬀ.
The equilibrium outcome in Proposition 1 is ineﬃcient in the sense that, in equi-
librium w3 is traded by the type α buyer; this trade generates a net surplus of −∆H.
15Throughout the paper, by equilibrium we mean a Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson
1982), or equivalently a Strong Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), of the
game at hand. We do not make use of any further reﬁnements. However, it should be pointed out
that whenever we assert that something is an equilibrium outcome, then it is the outcome of at least
one Sequential Equilibrium that passes the Intuitive Criterion test of Cho and Kreps (1987).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 15
The reason separation is impossible to sustain as an equilibrium outcome with
passive courts is not hard to outline. In any separating equilibrium, it is clear that
the type β buyer would trade w3 ex-post for a price p3 = ∆S +cS. The type β buyer
would also trade w2 for a price p2 = cL (this is in fact true in any equilibrium in
which the court does not void contracts for w2). Given that the type β buyer trades
both w2 and w3, the type α will always gain by deviating and pooling with the the
type β buyer.
5. Active Court Equilibria
A court that actively intervenes and voids contracts for w2 will be able to induce
separation between the two type of buyer and increase expected welfare.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium With An Active Court: Suppose the court is an active
player that can choose V as above, and that Assumption 1 holds. Then the unique
equilibrium outcome of the model is that C sets V = {s2} and the two types of buyer
separate: the type α buyer invests and trades w1 at a price p1 = cL and does not
trade w3; the type β buyer does not invest and only trades w3 at a price p3 = ∆S +
cS.






. By deﬁnition, this is also the court’s payoﬀ.
When the court voids contracts for either w1 or w2, the corresponding widget will
not be traded in equilibrium. This would be true for completely obvious reasons if the
court’s voiding makes the trade not feasible. It is also true when the court allows in
principle the trade of the widget ex-post acting as a minimal enforcement agency (see
footnote 13 above). This is because a classic hold-up problem obtains in our model,
driven by the relationship- and widget-speciﬁc investment. Given that the seller has
all the bargaining power ex-post, unless an ex-ante contract is in place the buyer will
be unable to recoup the cost of his investment and hence will not invest.
To see why the court’s intervention induces the two types of buyer to separate at
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the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 2. With a passive court, pooling
with the type α buyer involves positive payoﬀs both in the trade of w2 and in that
of w3 ex-post. Now that the court renders the trade of w2 impossible in equilibrium,
the payoﬀ to the type α buyer from deviating to pool with the type β buyer comes
only from the ex-post trade of w3. This decrease is enough to sustain the separating
equilibrium of Proposition 2.
The court’s intervention has two direct eﬀects. One is separation, so that the type
α buyer no longer ineﬃciently trades w3, and the other is the lack of trade of w2.
While the ﬁrst increases expected welfare, the second reduces it. Overall expected
welfare increases by (∆M − ∆L)/2
6. Stochastic Courts
Propositions 1 and 2 together say that while ineﬃcient pooling obtains when the
court enforces all contracts, this can be avoided when the court credibly announces
that it will void any contract for w2.
In the equilibrium in Proposition 2 the court eﬀectively forbids a proﬁtable in-
vestment and trade. The surplus, net of I, generated by w2 is strictly positive for
both types of buyer. A natural question then arises at this point. Can any of this lost
surplus be recovered by the court, without losing the advantage gained by inducing
separation as in Proposition 2?
The answer is that, provided that I is not too large, some of this surplus can in fact
be recovered by inducing an equilibrium like the one in Proposition 2, but in which
the trade of w2 is allowed. Suppose the court voids contracts for w2 with probability
strictly between zero and one. If this probability is too small, then using the logic
of Proposition 1, ineﬃcient pooling will obtain in equilibrium. The probability that
the court voids contracts for w2 must be high enough for the parties to separate. If
the probability that the court voids contracts for w2 is too large then neither type of
buyer will invest in w2 since the investment in w2 yields a return of zero to the buyer
when the contract is voided.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 17
To sum up, the lost surplus from w2 may be recovered in an equilibrium that is
similar to the one in Proposition 2 but in which w2 is traded if the probability that
the court voids contracts for w2 is neither too low nor too high. However, this range
shrinks as investment becomes more expensive. Consequently, I must be suﬃciently
low for this range to be nonempty.
Notice that if, say, the type β buyer invests in w2 when the court voids the ex-
ante contract to trade w2 the parties can still renegotiate and trade w2 at an ex-post
stage.16 However, following the court’s decision to void the ex-ante contract, the
trade of w2 will occur at a higher price since at the renegotiation stage the seller has
all the bargaining power and hence the price will transfer the entire surplus to the
seller. In particular, if the court upholds the contract to trade w2 trade will occur at
the price that reﬂects the buyer’s bargaining power, p2 = cL, while if the court voids
the contract to trade w2 trade will occur at the renegotiated price p0
2 = cL +∆L +I.
Similar considerations apply to the trade of w1.
The interpretation of a stochastic court is straightforward. Laws and the body of
precedents are suﬃciently ambiguous in many cases. The choice of interpretation in
such cases eﬀectively makes a court stochastic from the contracting parties’ point of
view.
Denote by µ1 and µ2 respectively the probabilities that the court voids contracts
for w1 and w2 respectively. Let F = (µ1,µ2).
Proposition 3. Equilibrium With A Stochastic Court: Suppose that Assumption 1
holds, and that the court is an active player that can choose F as above.
Assume also that I > 0 satisﬁes:
I <
∆L (∆M + ∆H + ∆S − cH + cS)
cH − ∆L − ∆M − ∆S − cS
(2)
16As discussed in footnote 13, we take the view that trade is feasible ex-post even when contract
terms are voided by the court. Of course in this case the terms of trade of w2 are renegotiated and
hence will diﬀer from the ones speciﬁed by the ex-ante contract. In particular, while the buyer has
all the bargaining power at the ex-ante stage the seller has all the bargaining power ex-post.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 18
Then it is optimal for C to set F = (0,µ) where µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗] with
µ
∗ =







and the two types of buyer separate.17 The type α buyer invests and trades w1 at a
price p1 = cL and does not trade w3. The type β buyer, on the other hand, invests
and trades w2 and w3. The trade of w2 occurs at a price p2 = cL with probability
(1 − µ) and at a renegotiated price p0
2 = cL + ∆L + I with probability µ while the
trade of w3 occurs at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.










By deﬁnition, this is also the court’s payoﬀ.
7. Menu Contracts
In two separate papers, Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) examine the general case of
an “Informed Principal” problem. Among other insights, they point out that, under
certain conditions a “menu contract” equilibrium may Pareto improve upon other
contracting arrangements.
A menu contract, roughly speaking, is a pooling contract oﬀered by diﬀerent
types of Principal which the Agent can accept or reject, before any of the Principal’s
private information is revealed. The menu contains an array of diﬀerent contractual
arrangements, one for each possible type of Principal. After the Agent accepts the
contract, which immediately becomes binding, the Principal announces his type to
the Agent, and hence determines which part of the menu array will regulate their
relationship from that point on.
The buyer in our model has private information and, ex-ante, makes a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller. Therefore he is an informed Principal.18 Since our
Proposition 1 asserts that with a passive court the equilibrium outcome is ineﬃcient,
17Using the numbers mentioned in footnote 8, the left-hand side of (2) equals 6/13. If we set I =
1/3 to satisfy (2), from (3) we obtain µ∗ = 45/73 and µ∗∗ = 6/7.
18In the terminology of Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) we are in the case of “Common Values”
examined in more detail in Maskin and Tirole (1992).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 19
a legitimate question is whether menu contracts can yield superior investment and
trading outcomes than the equilibrium outcomes we have identiﬁed above.
Allowing menu contracts would change somewhat the terms on which our model
justiﬁes court intervention, but still provides a robust rationale for active courts.
Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) extends the analysis in this paper to the
case in which menu contracts are allowed. Roughly speaking, the results can be
summarized as follows. If we maintain the assumption that w3 is not contractible ex-
ante, our conclusions of Sections 4 and 5 hold essentially unchanged. However, if we
allow ex-ante contracting on w3, as well as menu contracts the picture changes. When
menu contracts and ex-ante contracting on w3 are both allowed, if the court enforces
all contracts, multiple equilibrium outcomes obtain. Pooling as in Proposition 1 is
an equilibrium. However, the model also has an equilibrium in which a (non-trivial)
menu contract is oﬀered and the same separating outcome as in Proposition 2 obtains.
Clearly, even in this case an active court has a role in eliminating any possibility for
the parties to ineﬃciently pool in equilibrium.
8. Conclusion
Our main result (Propositions 1 and 2) can be viewed as identifying a kind of “second
best” phenomenon in an incomplete contract world. We start with a model in which
some degree of contractual incompleteness is assumed (the costs and values of each
widget are not veriﬁable and hence not contractible). In this world it is in fact welfare-
improving to impose further incompleteness by making some contracts eﬀectively
impossible in equilibrium. This is what our active court does. This is similar to
the ﬁnding in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) that under some conditions, when one
assumes that contracts are exogenously coarse, equilibrium contracts may be even
coarser than the constraints impose. However, our main result diﬀers from theirs in
that it does not assert that contracts will be coarse (or incomplete) in equilibrium.
Rather it asserts that imposing incompleteness can increase expected welfare.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 20
Appendix
Lemma A.1: Consider either the model with passive courts or any subgame of the
model with active courts following the court’s choice of V. In any equilibrium of the
model with passive courts, or of the subgame, w3 is traded with positive probability
by the type β buyer. Moreover, the equilibrium price of w3 is p3 = ∆S + cS.
Proof: We distinguish four, mutually exclusive, exhaustive cases.
Consider ﬁrst a possible separating equilibrium in which the two B types each
oﬀer a distinct contract at the ex-ante stage. In this case, at the ex-post stage it is
a best reply for type β buyers to accept oﬀers to trade w3 at a p3 ≤ ∆S + cS. Their
unique best reply is instead to reject any oﬀers to trade w3 at any p3 > ∆S + cS. By
standard arguments it then follows that in equilibrium it must be that w3 is traded
between S and type β buyers at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
The second case is that of a possible pooling equilibrium in which both types of
B oﬀer the same ex-ante contract to S with probability 1. In this case the beliefs of
S at the ex-post stage are that B is of either type with equal probability. The type β
buyer best reply to oﬀers to trade w3 at the ex-post stage is as in the previous case.
It is a best reply for type α buyers to accept oﬀers to trade w3 at a p3 ≤ cH − ∆H.
Their unique best reply is to reject any oﬀers to trade w3 at any p3 > cH −∆H. Since
Assumption 1 (parts ii and iii) implies that cH − ∆H > ∆S + cS, it now follows by
standard arguments that only two outcomes are possible in equilibrium: either w3 is
traded between S and both types of B at a price p3 = ∆S + cS, or w3 is not traded
at all because S does not make an oﬀer that is accepted by either type of B. The
seller’s expected proﬁt from trading w3 at p3 = ∆S + cS is given by ∆S + cS/2 −
cH/2, which is positive by Assumption 1 (parts i, ii and iii). Therefore, S will choose
to oﬀer to trade w3 at p3 = ∆S + cS. Hence the conclusion follows in this case.
The third case is that of a possible semi-separating equilibrium in which the type
β buyer oﬀers a separating contract at the ex-ante stage with probability strictly
between zero and one. In this case, the same logic of the ﬁrst case applies to showShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 21
that in equilibrium it must be the case that S and the type β buyers who oﬀer the
separating contract trade w3 at p3 = ∆S + cS.
The fourth and last case is that of a possible semi-separating equilibrium in which
the type β buyer oﬀers a separating contract at the ex-ante stage with probability
zero. Since some type α buyers are separating, there must be some contract that the
type β buyer oﬀers in equilibrium which is oﬀered by the type α buyer with a strictly
lower probability. Since the ex-ante probabilities of the two types of buyer are the
same, there is some contract oﬀered in equilibrium by the type β buyer such that
the seller’s beliefs after receiving the oﬀer are that he is facing a type α buyer with
probability ν ∈ (0,1/2). After this contract is oﬀered and accepted, in any Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium, the seller’s beliefs when he contemplates making an oﬀer to
trade w3 must also be that he faces the type α buyer with probability ν. Using the
same logic as in the second case, only two possibilities remain. Either w3 is traded
at p3 = ∆S +cS, or S makes an oﬀer that is not accepted. Given the beliefs we have
described, the seller’s expected proﬁt from trading w3 at p3 = ∆S + cS, is ∆S + νcS
− νcH, which is positive using ν < 1/2 and Assumption 1 (parts ii and iii). Hence S
will choose to trade w3 at p3 = ∆S + cS, and the conclusion follows in this case.
Lemma A.2: Suppose that C enforces all contracts. Then in any equilibrium of the
model w2 is traded with probability one by the type β buyer at a price p2 = cL.
Proof: Since the cost of w2 is independent of B’s type it is obvious that if it is traded,
then it is traded at p2 = cL.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an equilibrium in which with
positive probability w2 is not traded by the type β buyer. From Lemma A.1 we
know that in this equilibrium some type β buyers trade w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
Therefore, type β buyers have a payoﬀ of at most 0. (This follows from the fact that
their expected proﬁt from the w3 trade is zero, and the maximum proﬁt they can
possibly make by trading w1 is negative.) Consider now a deviation by the type β
buyer to oﬀering w2 at p2 = cL +ε with probability one. It is a unique best response
for the seller to accept oﬀers to trade w2 at any p2 > cL. It then follows that the typeShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 22
β buyer can deviate to such oﬀer and achieve a payoﬀ of ∆L − ε. For ε suﬃciently
small this is clearly a proﬁtable deviation for the type β buyer.
Lemma A.3: Suppose C enforces all contracts. Then in any equilibrium of the model
the type α buyer oﬀers a contract to trade w1 with probability zero.
Proof: Notice that by Lemma A.2 in any equilibrium the type β buyer trades w2 with
probability one. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an equilibrium in
which the type α buyer separates with positive probability and oﬀers a contract to
trade w1. In this case, the type α buyer’s payoﬀ must be ∆M. This follows from the
fact that, by separating, the type α buyer must be trading w1 at a price p1 = cL and,
since he separates, S will not trade w3 with him.
Suppose now that the type α buyer deviates to pool with the type β buyers who
trade w2 at p2 = cL and then trade w3 at p3 = ∆S +cS. By Lemmas A.1 and A.2 we
know that the type β buyer behaves in this way with positive probability. Following
this deviation the type α buyer’s payoﬀ is ∆H + cH − ∆H − ∆S −cS. The latter, by
Assumption 1 (parts i and iii) is greater than ∆M. Hence this is a proﬁtable deviation
for the type α buyer.
Lemma A.4: Suppose C enforces all contracts. Then in any equilibrium of the model
w2 is traded with probability one by the type α buyer at a price p2 = cL.
Proof: Since the cost of w2 is independent of B’s type it is obvious that if it is traded,
then it is traded at p2 = cL.
Suppose that the claim were false. Using Lemma A.3 we then know that, in some
equilibrium, with positive probability the type α buyer trades neither w1 nor w2. By
Lemma A.2 a type α buyer who does not trade w2 actually separates from the type β
buyer. Hence in any equilibrium in which with positive probability the type α buyer
trades neither w1 nor w2 the type α buyer’s payoﬀ is at most zero. (The seller will
not trade w3 with him because of separation, and he makes no proﬁt on either w1 or
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As in the proof of Lemma A.3 the type α buyer has a proﬁtable deviation from
this putative equilibrium. He can pool with the type β buyers who trade w2 at p2 =
cL and then trade w3 at p3 = ∆S +cS. After this deviation the type α buyer’s payoﬀ
is ∆H + cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS, which is positive by Assumption 1 (parts i and iii).
Lemma A.5: Suppose that C enforces all contracts. Then in any equilibrium of the
model w3 is traded with probability one by both types of B at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
Proof: From Lemmas A.2 and A.4 we know that the two types of B pool with
probability one at the ex-ante stage. The same reasoning as in the second case
considered in the proof of Lemma A.1 now ensures that in equilibrium w3 is traded
with probability one by both types of B at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
Proof of Proposition 1: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A.2, A.4
and A.5.
Lemma A.6: Consider the model with an active court, and any of the subgames
following C choosing a V that contains wi, i = 1,2. In any equilibrium of such
subgames neither type of B invests in wi, and hence it is not traded.
Proof: If wi ∈ V then the terms of its trade can be freely re-negotiated at the ex-post
stage, when S makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B, regardless of anything previously
agreed.
Now suppose that in any equilibrium both types of B invest in wi ∈ V with
positive probability. Then by standard arguments in any equilibrium it must be that
S oﬀers to trade wi at a price pi that makes one of the two B types indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting the oﬀer at the ex-post stage. But this since I > 0 this must
mean that one of the B types has an overall payoﬀ equal to −I. Since either type
of buyer can always guarantee a payoﬀ of zero (by not investing and not trading) we
can then conclude that in any equilibrium of any of these subgames it cannot be the
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Suppose then in any equilibrium only one type of B invests in wi ∈ V with positive
probability. Then by standard arguments in any equilibrium it must be that S oﬀers
to trade wi at a price pi that makes the type of buyer who is trading wi indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer at the ex-post stage. But this since I >
0 this must mean that this type of B has an overall payoﬀ equal to −I. Since, as
before, this type of buyer can always guarantee a payoﬀ of zero we can now conclude
that in any equilibrium of any of these subgames it must be that neither type of B
invests in wi ∈ V with positive probability.
Lemma A.7: Consider the model with an active court. In any equilibrium of the
subgame following C setting V = {w2} the type α buyer trades w1 with probability
one.
Proof: From Lemma A.6 we know that in this case neither type of B invests in w2,
and hence it is not traded.
Suppose that the type α buyer invests in w1 and trades it. His payoﬀ in this case
is at least ∆M. This is because clearly, in any equilibrium, p1 is cL, and at worst he
is unable to trade w3.
Suppose that instead the type α buyer does not invest in w1 and hence does not
trade it. Then his payoﬀ is at most cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS. This is because, using
Lemma A.1, at best he will be able to trade w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS. Using
Assumption 1 (part i and iii) we know that ∆M > cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS, and hence
the argument is complete.
Lemma A.8: Consider the model with an active court. In any equilibrium of the
subgame following C setting V = {w2} the type β does not invest in either w1 or w2,
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Proof: From Lemma A.6 we know that in this case neither type of B invests in w2,
and hence it is not traded.
Suppose that the type β buyer invests in w1. Then his payoﬀ must be negative.
This is because, using Lemma A.1, he either trades w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS or
does not trade w3 (in either case the proﬁt is zero), and using Lemma A.7 he trades
w1 at a price p1 = cL.
Since either type of buyer can always guarantee a payoﬀ of zero (by not investing,
making oﬀers that must be rejected, and rejecting all ex-post oﬀers) we can then
conclude that the type β buyer does not invest in w1.
Therefore, we know that the type β buyer does not invest in either w1 or w2.
Using Lemma A.7 and the same reasoning as in the ﬁrst case of Lemma A.1 we can
now conclude that the type β buyer trades w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
Lemma A.9: Consider the model with an active court. Suppose that C sets V =
{w2}, then the two types buyer separate: the type α buyer invests in w1 and only
trades w1 at a price of p1 = cL; the type β buyer does not invest in either w1 or w2
and only trades w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.







Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A.7 and A.8.
Lemma A.10: Consider the model with an active court. Suppose that C sets V =
{w1}. Then the unique equilibrium outcome is that the two types of buyer pool with
probability one: they both invest and trade w2 at a price p2 = cL, and they both
trade w3 at a price p3 = ∆S + cS.
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Proof: The proof essentially proceeds in the same way as the proof of Proposition
1. In fact by setting V = {w1}, the court simply takes away the possibility that
the parties may trade w1 via Lemma A.6. The details are omitted for the sake of
brevity.
Lemma A.11: Consider the model with an active court. Suppose that C sets V =
{w1,w2}. Then the two types of buyer pool: they do not invest in either w1 or w2
and they trade w3 at p3 = ∆S + cS.







Proof: The claim follows immediately from Lemma A.6 using the same reasoning as
in the second case of the proof of Lemma A.1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Using Assumption 1 (part i), the claim is an immediate
consequence of Lemmas A.9, A.10 and A.11.
Lemma A.12: Consider the model with a stochastic court, and any of the subgames
following C choosing any feasible F. In any equilibrium of any such subgame, w3 is
traded with positive probability by the type β buyer. Moreover, the equilibrium price
of w3 is p3 = ∆S + cS.
Proof: The argument is identical to the proof of Lemma A.1. We do not repeat the
details.
Lemma A.13: Consider the model with a stochastic court, and any of the subgames
following C choosing a F that contains µ1 ∈ [0,1]. In any equilibrium of such subgames
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Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that in some equilibrium the type β buyer
invests in w1 and w1 is traded at p1 ≥ cL. Then the type β buyer’s payoﬀ in this
equilibrium would be (1−µ1)(cL+∆N −p1)−µ1 I. Clearly for every µ1 ∈ [0,1], using
Assumption 1 (part i and iv), this payoﬀ is negative. Therefore the type β buyer has
a proﬁtable deviation by not oﬀering any contract and not investing. This deviation
yields a zero payoﬀ.
Lemma A.14: Consider the model with a stochastic court, and any of the subgames
following C choosing any feasible F. Then it is not possible that in any equilibrium
of such subgames the type α buyer invests and trades w2 while the type β does not
invest in (and hence does not trade) w2.
Proof: Recall that by Lemma A.12, in equilibrium the type β buyer trades w3 for a
price p3 = ∆S + cS with positive probability.
Suppose that the outcome of the statement of the Lemma did obtain in some
equilibrium. By Lemma A.13 we know that it must be the case that the type α buyer
does not invest in and trade either w1 or w2. Therefore he must be trading w3 ex-post
at p3 = ∆S + cS.
In this putative equilibrium the type α buyer obtains a payoﬀ of (1−µ2)∆H − µ2I.
If instead he deviates and pools with the type β buyer in trading only w3 ex-post he
gets cH − ∆H − ∆S−cS. By Assumption 1 (parts i, iii and iv), using (2) which implies
that µ∗∗ ≥ µ∗, provided that µ2 ≥ µ∗∗ = ∆L/(∆L + I), this is a proﬁtable deviation
for the type α buyer. Suppose then that µ2 < µ∗∗. In this putative equilibrium the
type β buyer gains a payoﬀ of 0. If instead he deviates to pooling with the type α
buyer and trades w2 at p2 = cL he obtains a payoﬀ of (1−µ2)∆L − µ2I. Since µ2 <
µ∗∗, this is a proﬁtable deviation for the type β buyer.
Lemma A.15: Consider the model with a stochastic court, and any of the subgames
following C choosing any feasible F. Then it is not possible that in any equilibrium
of such subgames the type α buyer does not invest and trade either w1 or w2, while
the type β invests in and trades w2.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 28
Proof: Recall that by Lemma A.12, in equilibrium the type β buyer trades w3 for a
price p3 = ∆S + cS with positive probability.
Suppose that the outcome of the statement of the Lemma did obtain in some
equilibrium. Then the payoﬀ to the type α buyer would be 0 since he would unable
to trade w3 ex-post after separating at the contract oﬀer stage.
Notice that if the type β buyer invests in and trades w2 then it must be that
µ2 ≤ µ∗∗, otherwise the type β buyer would obtain a negative payoﬀ in equilibrium.
Whenever µ2 ≤ µ∗∗, Assumption 1 (parts i and iii) implies that the type α buyer would
obtain a positive payoﬀ by deviating and pooling with the type β and investing and
trading w2.
Proof of Proposition 3: We deal separately with three diﬀerent possible scenarios.
The ﬁrst scenario is that of possible equilibria of subgames following the court’s
choice of F in which the type α buyer invests in and trades w1. Therefore in this
scenario the type β buyer trades w3 at p3 = ∆S+cS with probability 1. Using Lemma
A.13 we know that in this scenario only two cases are possible. In equilibrium either
the type β buyer invests in and trades w2 and w3, or the type β buyer only trades w3
ex-post. Consider the ﬁrst case. For this type of equilibrium to be viable we need the
following two sets of conditions to be satisﬁed. The ﬁrst set of conditions guarantee
that both types of buyer are willing to make their respective investments. These are:
(1 − µ1)∆M − µ1I ≥ 0 (A.1)
(1 − µ2)∆L − µ2I ≥ 0 (A.2)
The second set of conditions guarantee that neither type of buyer wants to deviate
from the separation that the equilibrium prescribes. These are:
(1 − µ1)∆M − µ1I ≥ (1 − µ2)∆H − µ2I + cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS (A.3)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 29
and
(1 − µ2)∆L − µ2I ≥ (1 − µ1)∆N − µ1I (A.4)
Using Assumption 1 (part i) it is immediate to see that (A.2) implies (A.4).











Observe next that if any of the inequalities (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) are satisﬁed for a
pair (µ1,µ2) then they will also be satisﬁed for any pair (µ0
1,µ2) with µ0
1 ∈ [0,µ1).
Therefore, choosing among the equilibria in this case, there is no loss in generality in
assuming that the court would choose an F such that µ1 = 0, and a µ2 that guarantees
that (A.2) and (A.3) are satisﬁed. For these two inequalities to be both satisﬁed we
need µ2 to be such that
cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS
∆H + I
= µ





It follows from Assumption 1 (parts i and iii) that whenever I satisﬁes the inequality
in (2), then µ∗ < µ∗∗, so that the range in (A.6) is not empty. Therefore the court’s
payoﬀ in this case is maximized by setting F = (0,µ) where µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗].
Consider now the second case in the ﬁrst scenario. Recall that in this type of
equilibrium the type β buyer does not invest in and trade w2. It follows that for this
type of equilibrium to be viable we must have that
(1 − µ2)∆L − µ2I ≤ 0 (A.7)
since otherwise he would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate and trade w2 at p2 = cL. For this
type of equilibrium to be viable we also need (A.1) to be satisﬁed, as well as conditions
that guarantee that neither type of buyer wants to deviate from the separation thatShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 30
the equilibrium prescribes. These are
(1 − µ1)∆M − µ1I ≥ cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS (A.8)
and
0 ≥ (1 − µ1)∆N − µ1I (A.9)







Observe next that if any of the inequalities (A.1), (A.7), (A.8), (A.9) are satisﬁed for
a pair (µ1,µ2) then they will also be satisﬁed for any pair (µ0
1,µ2) with µ0
1 ∈ [0,µ1).
Therefore, choosing among the equilibria in this case, there is no loss in generality in
assuming that the court would choose an F such that µ1 = 0, and a µ2 that guarantees






Therefore the court’s payoﬀ in this case is maximized by setting F = (0,µ2) with µ2
∈ [µ∗∗,1].
The second scenario we analyze is that of possible equilibria of subgames following
the court’s choice of F in which the type α buyer invests in and trades w2. From
Lemma A.14 we know that it must be that the type β buyer pools with the type α
buyer in trading w2 at p2 = cL and trades w3 ex-post at p3 = ∆S+cS with probability
1.
For this type of equilibrium to be viable we need the following two sets of condi-
tions to be satisﬁed. The ﬁrst set of conditions guarantee that both types of buyerShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 31
are willing to make their respective investments. These are:
(1 − µ2)∆H − µ2I + cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS ≥ 0 (A.12)
(1 − µ2)∆L − µ2I ≥ 0 (A.13)
The second set of conditions guarantee that neither type of buyer wants to deviate
from the pooling that the equilibrium prescribes. Assuming that after a deviation
the type α buyer is believed to be type α, which is the worst case to consider in what
follows, these are:
(1 − µ2)∆H − µ2I + cH − ∆H − ∆S − cs ≥ (1 − µ1)∆M − µ1I (A.14)
(1 − µ2)∆L − µ2I ≥ (1 − µ1)∆N − µ1I (A.15)
Notice that (A.14) implies that this type of equilibrium is viable only if
µ2 ≤
cH − ∆S − cS − (1 − µ1)∆M + µ1I
∆H + I
(A.16)



















Observe next that if any of the inequalities (A.12), (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) are
satisﬁed for a pair (µ1,µ2) then they will also be satisﬁed for any pair (µ1,µ0
2) with
µ0
2 ∈ [0,µ2). Therefore, choosing among the equilibria in this case, there is no loss in
generality in assuming that the court would choose an F such that µ2 ∈ [0,µ∗], and,
since the right-hand side of (A.16) is monotonic increasing in µ1, setting µ1 = 0. In
this case the right-hand side of (A.16) coincides with µ∗.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 32
The third scenario we analyze is that of possible equilibria of subgames following
the court’s choice of F in which the type α does not invest in and therefore does not
trade either w1 or w2. From Lemmas A.13 and A.15 we know that in this scenario it
must be the case that in equilibrium the type β buyer pools with the type α buyer.
Clearly in this type of equilibrium both types of buyer trade w3 ex-post at p3 =
∆S + cS.
For this type of equilibrium to be viable we need the following conditions to be
satisﬁed. The ﬁrst guarantees that the type β buyer does not want to deviate and
invest in and trade w2 (it is straightforward to check that he cannot proﬁt from
deviating and investing in and trading w1). This condition reads
(1 − µ2)∆L − µ2I ≤ 0 (A.18)
The other two conditions guarantee that the type α buyer does not want to deviate
and invest in and trade either w1 or w2. These are:
cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS ≥ (1 − µ1)∆M − µ1I (A.19)
and
cH − ∆H − ∆S − cS ≥ (1 − µ2)∆H − µ2I (A.20)






By Assumption 1 (parts i, iii and iv), using (2), if (A.21) holds then (A.20) is also
satisﬁed. Using (A.19) we can then conclude that this type of equilibrium is viable
only if (A.21) holds together with
µ1 ≥
∆M + ∆H + ∆S − cH + cS
∆M + I
(A.22)Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 33







We can now compare the three scenarios to complete the proof of the proposition.
Comparing the court’s payoﬀ in the two cases of the ﬁrst scenario and in the second
and third scenario, as given by (A.5), (A.10), (A.17) and (A.23) it is clear that the
court’s payoﬀ is highest in the ﬁrst case of the ﬁrst scenario. Recall that in this
equilibrium the court sets F = (0,µ) where µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗].
To conclude the proof we need to argue that the second case of the ﬁrst scenario
as well as the second and third scenarios are ruled out when F = (0,µ) where µ ∈
[µ∗,µ∗∗].
To see that an equilibrium of the type in the second case of the ﬁrst scenario
is ruled out notice that by Assumption 1 (parts i and iii), using (2), (A.11) is not
compatible with µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗). We can then show that there does not exists an
equilibrium of the game with a stochastic court where the court sets F = (0,µ∗∗) and
the parties behave as in the equilibrium of the type in the second case of the ﬁrst
scenario. Assume by way of contradiction that such an equilibrium exists. Then the
court’s payoﬀ is speciﬁed in (A.10). In this case, however, the court has a proﬁtable
deviation, by deviating and choosing F = (0,µ) with µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗) the court can
achieve the higher payoﬀ in (A.5).
To see that an equilibrium of the type in the second scenario is ruled out notice
that the payoﬀ in (A.17) is not compatible with µ ∈ (µ∗,µ∗∗]. We can then show
that there does not exists an equilibrium of the game with a stochastic court where
the court sets F = (0,µ∗) and the parties behave as in the equilibrium of the type in
the second scenario. Assume by way of contradiction that such an equilibrium exists.
Then the court’s payoﬀ is speciﬁed in (A.17). In this case, however, the court has
a proﬁtable deviation, by deviating and choosing F = (0,µ) with µ ∈ (µ∗,µ∗∗] the
court can achieve the higher payoﬀ in (A.5).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 34
To see that an equilibrium of the type in the third scenario is ruled out notice
that the payoﬀ in (A.23) is not compatible with µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗). We can then show that
there does not exists an equilibrium of the game with a stochastic court where the
court sets F = (0,µ∗∗) and the parties behave as in the equilibrium of the type in
the third scenario. Assume by way of contradiction that such an equilibrium exists.
Then the court’s payoﬀ is speciﬁed in (A.23). In this case, however, the court has
a proﬁtable deviation, by deviating and choosing F = (0,µ) with µ ∈ [µ∗,µ∗∗) the
court can achieve the higher payoﬀ in (A.5).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 35
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